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INCENTIVIZING PRACTICE 
Paul Duguid 
Intro 
Social capital has proved an increasingly useful and--as this workshop itself testifies--
influential perspective for understanding learning, work, and innovation in a 
knowledge society.  The social capital [SC] approach shares a great deal with 
community of practice analysis--the perspective this paper will attempt to lay out.  In 
particular, in discussions susceptible to individualistic and economistic thinking, both 
stress the social underpinnings of knowledge work. 
As this workshop is focused on the notion of SC, and most contributions will 
explore SC's particular strengths, it seems less useful to go over the common ground 
between the two perspectives, extensive though that is, than to discusses differences 
between the two, and by extension what community of practice [CoP] theory can add 
to our understanding.  So I will focus here on what is distinctive about the CoP 
approach and in the process offer a critique--but I hope a constructive critique--of SC 
theory and its assumptions.1 
SC theory draws attention to the networks of individuals which help to embed 
economic interactions in social relations (Polanyi, 1944; Granovetter, 1985).  Through 
social exchanges, people build webs of trust (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993, 2000), 
obligation, reputation, expectations, and norms (Coleman, 1988).  In these webs and 
through these relations, SC theory suggests, people are willing and able to share 
knowledge. 
The CoP perspective goes along with these claims until it pauses at the word 
"able."  That is, CoP analysis accepts the importance of social capital networks to 
understanding why people will and will not share.  But the CoP perspective makes a 
distinction between people's willingness to share and their ability to share.  It suggests 
that people have to engage in similar or shared practices to be able to share new and 
                                                 
1 There have been several recent critiques of social capital from other perspectives.  A special issue of 
Journal of Economic Issues on "Social Capital, Karl Polanyi, and American Social and Institutional 
Economics" (Summer, 2003) in particular noted that it was being used as a way for governments to 
avoid their responsibilities.  See Carrol & Stanfield (2003), Dolfsma & Dannreuther (2003), and van 
Staveren (2003); see also Portes & Landolt (1996).  
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innovative knowledge about those practices.2  Thus, where SC theory points to the 
unseen links that unite people, CoP theory points equally to unseen boundaries--
boundaries shaped by practice--that divide knowledge networks from one another, 
despite all the obligations of good will and social capital that may connect them. 
The two theories differ, then, over their assumptions of the way knowledge 
circulates.  Such assumptions are critical to any discussion of innovation and the right 
social incentives for promoting it.  Currently, discussions concerning new ICT related 
incentives--digital rights management or software patents, for example--are becoming 
increasingly contentious.3  It is 50 years since Penrose (1952) claimed that "If national 
patent laws did not exist, it would be difficult to make a conclusive case for 
introducing them."  To many eyes, in the intervening period, the intellectual property 
incentive system has graduated from being merely inadequate to being 
counterproductive.  Mowery, Nelson, Sampat & Ziedonis (2001) believe patenting is 
now inhibiting U.S. scientific communication.  Foray (1997) and others are concerned 
about a general tendency of the system to "tip" away from openness.  David (2003) 
and Kogut & Metiu (2001) are among several who believe we should worry less about 
the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968), which has been freely invoked to justify 
rigorous intellectual property, than about the tragedy of the anticommons" (Heller & 
Eisenberg, 1998).  Built to promote innovation, the intellectual property system may 
rather be strangling it.4  Thus the two different perspectives on the flow of knowledge 
contested here, however abstruse, have practical--and timely--policy implications.   
In offering the distinct perspective of CoP theory, this paper holds that, while 
emphasizing social in the research lexicon, SC has nonetheless remained fairly close 
to its roots in economics (residual in that word capital).5  This has a couple of 
implications.  First, SC theorists' focus on "rational actors" (Coleman, 1988) portrays 
social groups as little more than "combinations" of individuals (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
                                                 
2 The emphasis here is on "new and innovative"; as I note later in the paper,  society has built numerous 
workarounds to deal with established, settled knowledge. 
3 Some will find it hard to think of digital rights management as an incentive scheme, but that is how it 
is presented in Stefik's (1996) seminal paper on the topic. 
4 Lawyers seem to have been more aggressive than economists in pointing to the flaws of the IP 
system.  See Boyle, 1996; Lessig, 1999, 2001; Litman, 2001 and Law and Contemporary Problems, 
special issue 2003  66 (1&2). 
5 Coleman is quite explicit about this.  His aim is "to import the economist's principle of rational action 
for use in the analysis of social systems proper ... [t]the concept of social capital is a tool to aid in this" 
(1988, p. 97). 
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1996).  The CoP perspective, by contrast, sees knowledge-sharing networks as more 
complex than the aggregate choice of individual rational actors.  So, while SC 
analysis ranges indifferently over a broad array of social groups, including such things 
as firms, bowling leagues, housing organizations, and families, the CoP perspective, 
by contrast, limits itself to communities and networks that are distinguished by the 
particular practices members share and in which membership can only be achieved by 
entering into the practice.  
Second, while some SC theorists, again like economists, tend to view the 
sharing of knowledge as little more than the exchange of "information that facilitates 
action" (Coleman, 1988, p. 104) between individuals, CoP theory suggests that 
isolation of individuals and information underestimates the challenge of sharing 
knowledge and fails to predict where knowledge "sticks" (von Hippel, 1994; Cowan, 
David, & Foray, 1999) or "leaks" (Szulanski, 1996)--critical questions for a 
knowledge society. 
This paper thus begins by challenging economistic views of knowledge 
sharing, noting in particular the effort of some economists to dismiss the notion of 
tacit knowledge from debates about innovation.  Tacit knowledge, important to CoP 
theory, is problematic for economists because it is hard to explain in terms of 
information exchanged between individuals. 
The paper then explores the links between the tacit dimension of knowledge 
and social practice.  It looks "beyond information" and "beyond individuals" to argue 
that practice forms two interconnected knowledge groupings, the community of 
practice and the network of practice.  It is these that help predict the flow--or lack of 
flow--of new knowledge in society.  The paper goes on to argue that social practice 
has two dimensions, the epistemic and the ethical. These explain not only why people 
will and will not share knowledge (the focus of SC theory), but also where, despite 
good will, knowledge can and cannot flow.  The epistemic dimension determines 
where knowledge sticks, the ethical helps explain why it leaks. 
Having followed a principally theoretical path, the paper then pauses to 
analyze "Open Source" software in the terms it has laid out.  This discussion helps 
link the issues raised so far to ICTs.  Moreover, Open Source is an area of particular 
interest because it has challenged conventional ideas about incentives for and the 
organization of innovative in a knowledge society.  Open Source networks are 
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celebrated for leaking knowledge (hence the open in open source), but we also need 
to understand where and why Open Source knowledge sticks.  The paper suggests that 
such an understanding helps illuminate in terms of practice the different roles of 
networks and organizations. 
In conclusion, the paper questions both the assumption that ICTs circulate 
knowledge and the assumption that stronger intellectual property provides better 
incentives for innovation.  It argues that if we seek to promote innovation and 
communications, we should attend neither to information nor  to knowledge, per se, 
but to practice and its social, organizational, epistemological, and ethical entailments.  
In closing, it suggests that the system of copyright, patents, and trademarks should be 
altered to keep knowledge "open." 
Tacit  Knowledge & Skeptical  Economists 
Stigler (1961) opens a seminal essay on the economics of information with a rapid but 
not atypical transition between information and knowledge: "One should hardly have 
to tell academicians that information is a valuable resource: knowledge is power" (p. 
213).  More generally the economics of information and of knowledge seem 
indistinguishable or interchangeable (Arrow, 1969).  Consequently, many discussions 
of incentives for a knowledge society focus primarily on the circulation of 
information and the extent to which it can be carried by ICTs and encouraged by legal 
protection of intellectual property,  or sheltered by organizations (Schumpeter, 1947; 
Chandler, 1962; Nelson & Winter, 1982).  Tacit knowledge makes problems.  How do 
we share something that is tacit?  How to we put it in ICTs?  Hence, while economists 
and economic historians increasingly embrace the contribution of knowledge to 
economic progress (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Mokyr, 1990; North, 1980, 1992) and the 
"knowledge economy" (Mokyr, 2002), they treat tacit knowledge with a certain 
suspicion and move quickly, like Stigler, to information.  
Atypically, Cowan, David and Foray (1999) make their move explicit.  They 
describe their approach as "the skeptical economist's guide to 'tacit knowledge.'" 
These skeptical economists (SE) motivate their argument from a paradox they detect 
in appeals for government-subsidized incentives for innovation.  On the one hand, the 
SE note, these appeals justify government funding by arguing that markets deal 
poorly with nonrivalrous, nonexcludable public goods like knowledge.  Yet, when it 
is claimed that national subsidies are inefficient because some nations will free ride 
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on the economic subvention of others, the same people, according to the SE, argue 
that tacitness will make the new knowledge  "sticky" and so prevent free riding.6  The 
two claims, the SE argue, are incompatible.  Knowledge can't be both so "leaky" that 
markets fail, and yet so "sticky" that free riding fails.  The source of this incoherence, 
the SE claim, lies in this quasi-mystical notion of tacitness that they seek to dismiss.7 
Champions of the tacit are guilty, the SE argue, of concluding that what they 
can't see must inherently invisible.  While it may be true that a groups of experienced 
colleagues, in Polanyi's famous phrase, "know more than [they] can say," it does not 
follow what is left unsaid is fundamentally unsayable.  Rather, the SE claim, the 
relevant knowledge is merely "latent" in such groups, whose members do not need to 
codify and thus lack incentives to overcome the "substantial marginal cost" of 
codification.8  There is, from this point of view, no logical barrier between tacit and 
explicit, only an economic one. 
There are many reasons to take the SE argument seriously.  David, in 
particular, has helped show economists the problems of market failure and the limits 
of neoclassical approaches to knowledge, he is dubious about the benefits of the 
current intellectual property system, and he is committed to "openness" in science. 
Above all, he and his colleagues take the problem of the tacit seriously: "the nature of 
knowledge, its codification or tacitness, lurks only just beneath the surface of 
important ideas about economic growth" (p. 12).9 
Yet their dismissal is not as conclusive as they would like it to be.  In the first 
place, they actually avoid the heart of the question they raise, setting aside the 
category of "unarticulated and unarticulable knowledge" as "not very interesting" (p. 
14).  Their conclusions thus arise from analysis of knowledge that they have agreed in 
advance is either "articulated (and thus codified)" or unarticulated but codifiable. 
                                                 
6 The SE paper doesn't actually provide examples of either argument but simply talks of "the standard 
argument" put forward by "proponents" who are identified as Harry Collins (1974), Michel Callon 
(1995), and Bruno Latour (who is indicted but not cited); a group that ideologically does not sit happily 
together. 
7 The paradox of knowledge appearing both sticky and leaky is addressed in Brown & Duguid (2001), 
on which much of the discussion here is based. 
8 For economic ideas of coding, see Arrow (1964). 
9 Others tend to skirt the issue.  Mokyr (2002), for instance, notes the tacit and claims it is uncodifiable, 
but doesn’t go on to weigh what the implications of that claim are.  See also Nelson & Winter (1982), 
pp 76-82, whose conclusion on p. 82, the SE seem to be following. 
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Further, in its analysis of codification (the process of transforming tacit 
knowledge into explicit knowledge), the SE's argument seems to have a logical flaw.  
Codification, they argue, merely requires a suitable codebook.  With the right 
codebook, any piece knowledge becomes economically tractable.  There are economic 
costs to producing such a codebook, but not, in the SE argument, epistemological 
barriers.  They fail to show, however, how we come to understand any particular 
codebook in order to decode the knowledge to which it applies.  A codebook must 
either explain itself or require another codebook to explain it.  The argument is thus 
trapped between circularity (with codebooks explaining themselves) and an infinite 
regress (with codebooks explaining codebooks). 
Of course there is another alternative.  There could be another kind of 
knowledge to get us started.10  This would seem to be what serious proponents of the 
tacit are trying to argue.  In a tradition that stretches back less to the sociologists of 
science that the SE name than to Socrates and the Meno, a chain of arguments 
suggests that codified knowledge rests on an uncodifiable substrate.  It is this that 
Polanyi (1966) calls not tacit knowledge, but importantly the "tacit dimension." 
Beyond Information 
Ryle (1949) makes a similar argument with his famous distinction between know how 
and know what.  These two are not alternative kinds of knowledge.  They are 
interdependent dimensions of knowledge.  Consequently, know how doesn't reduce to 
know what--a book of codified knowledge.  Rather know how allows us to interpret 
know what and make it actionable.  Avoiding a regress, this tacit dimension or know 
how is logically distinct and separately acquired from the explicit or know what, but it 
makes the latter actionable.  Usable knowledge is always two-dimensional. (Even 
theorizing, Ryle argues, requires a particular know how--the know how of theorizing.)  
Thus, while the SE argue that codification and explication are the essence of learning, 
Ryle suggests that no amount of explicit know what can produce tacit know how.  We 
learn how, he argues, in practice.   
This two-dimensional character of knowledge helps explain the contradictory 
character of knowledge from which the SE launch their argument.  Those who have 
                                                 
10 The SE in part concede this point, noting that "Successfully reading the code ... may involve prior 
acquisition of considerable knowledge (quite possibly including knowledge not written down 
anywhere)" (p. 9).  They give no explanation of how this is acquired. 
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acquired know how through practice can make use of and understand related know 
what.11  Consequently, for them, codified know what related to that practice would be 
an inherently leaky, nonrivalrous, public good, able to spread readily and usefully 
among other practitioners.  Scientific disciplines, professional societies, and other 
networks of practitioners (what Strauss (1978) calls "social worlds") share know what 
in documents, phone calls, faxes, email messages, etc. with relative ease.  For those 
who lack the practice, the same know what is inherently sticky, communicating little 
or nothing actionable.  Academics speaking outside their discipline, judges instructing 
juries in the law, economists talking to humanists all meet points at which the 
significance of what they are saying, transparent to the speaker and his or her "world," 
becomes opaque to the audience. 
It would appear, then, that the standard elision between information and 
knowledge can be problematic.  Know what is pretty much what economists mean 
when they talk of information and is inherently "leaky."12  It is the sort of stuff we 
pass around or store in ICTs.  But to be useful, requires the requisite know how.  
While we can store or transfer information/know what in IT systems, while we can 
balance information asymmetries, while we can explore the transaction costs of 
information exchanges, the outcome of this effort is futile if the second dimension, the 
requisite know how is not in place.  And know how, by contrast, is "sticky."  It doesn't 
fill codebooks, cannot be stored or transmitted in IT systems, is indifferent to 
information symmetries, and can make transaction costs exorbitant. 
Focus on information alone may not merely be ineffectual but also 
counterproductive.  Incentives for codification, for example, may actually impede the 
development of know how, the ability, in SE terms, to decode.  For example, 
educational and training systems tend to assume that the ideal place to transfer know 
what are technologies of learning (from the classroom to the computer terminal) that 
withdraw learners from the messiness of everyday life.  They thereby hide from 
learners the very social-material conditions of practice from which we acquire know 
                                                 
11 It doesn't necessarily explain self-serving arguments for subsidy. 
12 This argument that we produce information through elaborate processes (Duguid, 1996), echoes 
Tuomi's (2001) argument that. T. S. Eliot's often-quoted progression from data to knowledge is upside 
down. 
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how.  Consequently, some learning technologies can paradoxically increase the 
difficulty of learning.13 
Beyond Individuals 
Ryle's argument that we gain know how not through receiving know what, but through 
practice--through our engagement in the material and social world--puts him (perhaps 
surprisingly) in the tradition of practice theorists, a tradition that stretches back to 
Aristotle and has been recently revitalized by, among others, Oakeshott (1991) and 
Bourdieu (1977) and underpins Lave's notion of communities of practice.  In this 
tradition, knowledge is less a thing than an aspect of the relation between a person and 
the world.  Thus the knowledge of the high-energy physicists that Knorr-Cetina 
(1999) studied is "object centered," that is, the physicists' knowledge is structured 
around objects through which and on which they work.  Similarly, the knowledge 
possessed by the technicians in Orr's (1996) classic study of the Xerox service 
representatives (or "reps") rose out of, was expressed in relation to, and is inseparable 
from the machines that they worked on.  The knowledge of the navigators Hutchins 
(1991) studied or the physicists Collins (1974) studied again reflect the tools with 
which they work and world these tools make visible.  In each case, the particular 
person-world relation of participants develops a particular kind of know how that 
makes related know what intelligible and actionable.   
One corollary of this relational view is that knowledge is socially situated: the 
"world" in the person-world relation includes the social world--colleagues, 
competitors, clients, etc.--was well as the material world.  Thus learning, in Lave & 
Wenger's (1991) view is not the acquisition of information, but the development of a 
social identity.  In learning physics successfully, you learn to be a physicist--to act as 
and be recognized as a physicist.  A second corollary is that people who share a 
particular practice and thus share similar person-world relations come to share know 
how that allows them to communicate know what.   The knowledge of the 
microbiologists Knorr-Cetina also studied is also object centered, like that of the 
physicists.  But the objects involved are significantly different.  Consequently, as 
Knorr-Cetina argues, the two fields construct their knowledge/identities differently 
                                                 
13 Of course, for learners that already possess the requisite know how, these technologies may work 
well. 
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and develop into distinct "epistemic cultures."  As the notion of a "culture" suggests, 
the groups that form around practice are not merely combinations of individuals, as 
SC theory would suggest.  Shared practice creates social groups with distinct 
properties.  In them, know what relevant to the common practice circulates efficiently 
and effectively (Kreiner, 2001) supported by the shared substrate of know how.  Of 
course, we share a great deal of practice by virtue of being human.  But participation 
in specialized and esoteric practices inevitably reduces the number of people with 
whom we can communicate effectively about that practice--though we may be in the 
same bowling league. 
Aside from humanity at large, two related kinds of social group that develop 
around practice seem of particular significance when trying to understand innovation.  
The first is the community of practice (CoP), whose members not only have a practice 
in common but coordinate that practice with one another.  The second is the network 
of practice (NoP), whose members share but do not directly and systematically 
coordinate practice. 
The Community of  Pract ice  
Developed in a theory of learning proposed by Lave and Wenger (1991), the CoP 
comprises a group of people who share, coordinate, and over time help to reproduce 
their practice.14  The CoP is the social locus through which aspects of a person's 
identity related to that practice are developed and in which that identity is 
performed.15  A CoP's members are interdependent, their person-world relations 
significantly similar, their practice often collaborative, so the knowledge related to 
that practice is distributed across the collective rather than held by individuals 
(Hutchins, 1995).16  These knowledge collectives do not fit easily with some 
conventional economic views of knowledge.  Simon (1991), for example, argues that 
all learning takes place inside individual human heads (p. 12), while Mokyr (2002) 
                                                 
14 It seems right to start from a theory of learning, given Edquist's (1997) mandate of "learning to the 
center" (p.  16). 
15 Everyone has multiple sites in which they acquire and perform identities.  For many, their work 
identity is among the most significant (the answer to the question "what do you do?").  Given that any 
CoP member will have an idiosyncratic set of identity sites, CoP members, though they may have 
much in common, are nonetheless diverse. 
16 Some people, and perhaps even Lave & Wenger, do not restrict the CoP to an interdependent group.  
It was with the purpose of distinguishing interdependent groups from groups of people that share 
practice but do not coordinate one another's practice that Brown & Duguid (2001) introduced the 
notion of the network of practice (see below). 
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argues that knowledge resides in people's minds (or storage devices) (p. 4).  Social 
relations, collaborative work, and distributed identities do not figure into these 
models.  The CoP perspective does not deny the integrity of the individual--given 
their distinct life trajectories, each individual's person-world relation, however similar 
to others', will be distinct.  But the CoP perspective situates individuality in social 
relations, making separating individual from collective knowledge difficult and often 
pointless.17  
Many organization theorists have found the CoP to be inherently attractive 
notion.  But it needs to be noted that the process of identity formation is more or less 
indifferent to the identity formed.  The concept would seem applicable the formation 
of drug using collectives (Bourgeois, 1998), Mafia families (Lewis, 1964), or the 
inner circle of megalomaniac dictators (Sebag Montefiore, 2003).  Moreover, even 
more socially acceptable groups are not necessarily collegial or compliant.  Invested 
in the reproduction of a practice over time, the CoP is rife with internal tensions 
around "continuity and displacement" (Lave & Wenger, 1991).  Shared practice may 
provide grounds for a fight as much as grounds for agreement.  Collective defence of 
shared identity also creates external tensions between a CoP and those who would 
change its practice from outside.18  The CoP may then be both less comfortable than 
an SC network.19  But, as a site where knowledge is developed and shared, the CoP is 
critical to understanding innovation. 
                                                 
17 Knorr-Cetina (1999) talks of a new epistemic subject, a procurer of knowledge that is collective and 
dispersed (p. 178). 
18 The argument in Brown & Duguid (1991) has recently been condemned as "structuralist 
functionalist" (Contu & Willmott, 2003) for arguing that the CoP of reps furthered the aims of the 
company.  The reps proved an interesting example because by ignoring the company's instructions they 
saved their company from its own inept instructions.  The paper did not claim, as Contu & Willmott 
suggest, that all CoPs have this property.  Indeed, a cursory reading would suggest that the CoPs that 
designed the documentation for the reps and the CoPs of engineers that denigrated the reps' knowledge, 
while following managerial instructions were a detriment to strategic goals.  Whatever the functionalist 
appearance of the reps, they highlighted the significance of local, communal knowledge.  Probably 
antedating Taylor and certainly since Roy's classic studies (1952, 1953, 1954), the literature has been 
well-stocked with examples of disruptive workers and small group "goldbricking." Consequently, 
organizations and academics have felt free to deprecate local knowledge and disrupt small group 
cohesion.  A central goal of Brown & Duguid (1991) was to give an alternative vision of local 
knowledge.  It was not to deny that small group actions may undermine corporate interests.  Vaast 
(2003), in her Ph.D. thesis explores "the dark side" of CoPs, showing that they may not act even in 
their own interests, let alone a corporation's.  
19 It is often forgotten that Coleman (1988) insisted that SC accounted for such things as cartels and 
could reduced innovativeness. 
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The Network of  Pract ice  
My schema reserves the term CoP for interdependent practitioners who share and 
coordinate practice and have implicit responsibility for the reproduction of their 
community.  But most practices are shared by more than local practitioners.  The NoP 
designates the collective of all practitioners of a particular practice, of which the CoP 
is then a subset.  Thus Knorr-Cetina's (1999) epistemic culture of high-energy 
physicists constitutes a global NoP, in which particular labs form local CoPs.  
Equally, the local CoP of Xerox technicians that Orr (1996) studied is a subset of a 
worldwide NoP of some 20,000 reps doing similar jobs. 
It needs to be acknowledged that network is on its own a vague term 
(Zucharman, 2003)--as indeed is group (Merton, 1968) and community (Williams, 
1976).  There are economic networks (some of which replace market relations, and 
some of which include market relations) and there are social networks (in some of 
which the people know each other and in others they don't).  There are networks 
where the intriguing feature is the nodes, and networks where it is the link.  There are 
networks with heterogeneous nodes or links, and networks with homogeneous nodes 
or links.  There are formal networks, and there are informal networks.  In truth, almost 
any aggregate can be called a network.  Some discrimination is useful. 
The NoP is a primarily social non-market network, with homogenous nodes 
(practitioners), whose members are united by the similarity of their practice and, by 
extension, the person-world relations they engage in.20  (The SC network is similar, 
but its members are connected by social ties rather than ties of practice.)  Within these 
NoPs, common practices allow the members to exchange know that and common 
person-world relations allow this to be "reembedded" (Giddens, 1990) in a local 
context in a relatively effective, coherent way.21  In such networks, then, as Ryle 
argues, practice precedes theory, providing the substrate on which theoretical 
knowledge circulates.  In attempting to move between NoPs--even along paths built 
by SC--where by definition practice is not continuous, knowledge is likely to sticks. 
                                                 
20 This last is an important distinction.  Distinct person-world relations make the network of nurses 
distinct from the network of doctors (Leonard & Sensiper, 1998); the network of accountants distinct 
from networks of forecasters (Arrow, 1984); or networks of conmen distinct from the genuine 
practitioners they imitate. 
21 The work-related NoP is thus similar to Barley's (1988) occupational communities, but NoPs are not 
only work related. 
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The CoP and the NoP are ideal types that like most sociological categories 
suffer "boundary specification problems."  Relations among members are most dense 
in the CoP and fade gradually towards oblivion at the outer reaches of the NoP as the 
amount of practice in common diminishes and the variation in person-world relations 
grows.  Boundaries between CoP and NoP or between NoP and other practices and 
practitioners are not necessarily well defined.  The major distinction between the CoP 
and the NoP turns on the control and coordination of the reproduction of a group and 
its practice.  Within a CoP--whether it is a department of economists in a university, a 
group of coders in an IT department, or a criminal "family" in a New Jersey suburb--
members influence on who joins and under what terms and so directly affect the 
evolution of local practice.22  NoPs, by contrast, are more extensive and less 
coordinated. 
NoPs offer a powerful example of the kind of networks along which 
information, supported by shared practices, moves with extraordinary efficiency--and 
where it can be easily supported by ICTs.  Powell, Koput, Smith-Doerr (1996) reveal 
networks stretching through diverse institutions--universities, research labs, small 
firms, large corporations--distributing knowledge across organizational boundaries, 
even in the competitive world of biotechnology.  The "locus of learning," these 
authors argue, is the network rather than the individual firm.  Their study focuses for 
the most part on formal networks.  Kreiner & Schultz (1993) discuss similar but 
informal and often unauthorized links that sidestep formal restrictions but allow 
practitioners in one organization to draw on knowledge generated elsewhere and 
circulating through NoPs.23 Such leakage along NoPs does not only involve science or 
high-tech NoPs.  Every profession has its workshops, conferences, and annual 
meetings for knowledge sharing, and most practitioners at one time or another reach 
out across competitive boundaries to draw on connections in other companies.  As 
Offer (1994) argues, the market economy has always been porous.  NoPs do not 
necessarily show us something new, but they do help us to see where the leaks have 
and have not been occurring. 
                                                 
22 Continuity is important here.  Transient groups of people--work teams--that do not reproduce 
themselves over time are not, in this analysis, CoPs.  Of course, workplace CoPs don't usually get to 
choose their members, but as Lave & Wenger (1991) point out, such groups have their own powers of 
exclusion which can give them a certain amount of control over their reproduction. 
23 For recent work on networks, for example, the Tedis group in Venice (Charvesio et al., 2003) and 
Teigland's (2003) Ph.D. thesis at the Stockholm School of Economics. 
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They also help us understand the value of leakiness.  The density of such 
NoPs, the distribution of practitioners, and the extent of leaking help explain the 
vitality of industrial districts (Marshall, 1916; Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Brown & 
Duguid, 2001) and their "regional advantage" (Saxenian, 1994).  Networks running 
across districts like Silicon Valley help overcome "innovators' dilemmas" 
(Christensen, 1997) by pushing knowledge from where it is developed but stuck to 
where it is more likely to be used.  In so doing, NoPs may help spur aggregate growth, 
but at the expense of the initial innovator--an outcome that questions the advisability 
of tight intellectual property rights and hermetic "regimes of appropriation" which 
separate the rights individual economic actors from the interests of larger collectives.  
Innovation and Communication 
We have so far looked from the perspective of practice at, for the most part, the 
circulation of knowledge.  Any theory of innovation has also to explain its production.  
At base, invention requires having new ideas, which, from a practice perspective, 
entails a change in person-world relations.  As neither the world nor an individual's 
identity is static, this relation is always changing.24  New practice remains like a 
private language if kept at the level of the individual.  When it becomes social 
practice, it has taken an initial step on the Schumpeterian journey from invention to 
innovation, which, as Tuomi (2002) argues, "happens when social practice changes" 
(p. 10).25  This definition helps map the terrain on which innovation can occur, from 
changes in local practice within a community, to changes propagated along a network 
of practice, to--the most challenging of all--changes spread beyond the network to 
affect other practices.  In this way, the social context is both a determinant and a 
register of innovation.  
Within CoPs, novelty can propagate almost invisibly through coordinated 
practice.  It may not always do so, however.  As a site of identity formation, CoPs 
                                                 
24 Knowledge is a dynamic phenomenon, though paradoxically, a great deal of unnoticed effort seems 
to go into both keeping routine stable in a changing world and keeping the effort involved in stabilizing 
routine invisible.  Dynamic in the cause of stability, we conceal from ourselves, as Suchman (1989) has 
shown, a great deal of the spontaneous change to which we are involved. 
25 Edquist's (1997) notion of introducing new knowledge or new combinations of knowledge into the 
economy, Mokyr's (2002) idea of new useful knowledge, or Nelson & Winters' (1982) idea of "changes 
in routine" are all congruent with Tuomi's (2002) definition, but tend to focus on knowledge and to 
heighten the tendency to think of knowledge as a self-sufficient entity with inherent properties.  The 
importance of Tuomi's definition is that it changes focus to practice. 
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represent major personal investment by members.  Change, whether driven from 
within or without affects those identities and can meet with strong resistance.  The 
battle between continuity and change can be fierce.26  Beyond the CoP, new ideas can 
also spread among practitioners, though as noted the varying social and material 
circumstances in which it must be reembedded will cause mutations.  As NoPs are 
less tightly coordinated, resistance to change is less likely to be as fiercely contested.  
New ideas can simply be ignored until demand for network coherence becomes 
unavoidable.  Even scientific communities seem able to manage in practice a fair 
amount of loose coupling and incoherence, though they are, as Ziman (1968) notes, 
more committed than the humanities or social sciences to seeking consensus.   
Once the practitioners are separated, however, the challenge of 
communication among them grows.  Academic NoPs, while useful illustrations (given 
the likely audience of this paper), can conceal the challenge of communication 
because, unlike many NoPs, communication is very much a part of their practice.  
Sociologists of science seemed shocked to discover that writing is central to scientific 
practice and documents are critical scientific instruments (Latour & Woolgar, 1986), 
but reflective scientists have long recognized this (Ziman, 1968).  Scientific 
publishing does not merely record scientific practice; it is, as Ziman noted, scientific 
practice.  Yet even here where the process of disembedding and reembedding, of 
annunciation and interpretation, are part of practice, communication cannot be taken 
for granted.  But the disciplines have highly formal processes to help promote 
communication in the network (which are undoubtedly backed up by many informal 
ones).  In networks where the practice does not involve communication and formal 
systems are not in place, disembedding know what from practice can be far more 
demanding.and the task of formalizing and of disembedding alien to practitioners and 
resented.ERP and other systems that demand increasing formal reporting can be seen 
by people them not as an extension of their practice but a burden upon it (Micheelson 
                                                 
26 Contu & Willmott (2003) insist on the importance of setting CoP relations in the context capitalist 
relations.  Many CoPs are inevitably the product of capitalist organizations, though the CoP as a social 
structure would certainly antedate capitalism.  Moreover, CoPs may develop in a semi-autonomous 
fashion and their reproduction may exist in tension with changes dictated by the firm.  The tensions 
between research labs and corporations or between academic departments and universities offer 
conventional examples, but the same clash of interests may occur between any CoP and the 
organization on which it depends.  This clash of interests may also occur within the CoP,between those 
whose loyalty to an overarching organization is stronger than their loyalty to the CoP and those who 
are more loyal to the CoP and related NoPs.  Ziman (1968) discusses the effects of divided loyalty on 
scientists working within corporations, but this division can be generalized. 
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& Damkjar, 2002).  The failure of "knowledge management" systems, often designed 
by people to whom the demands of academic communication have become relatively 
invisible, may arise from this extra and complex demand (Hansen, 2000; Bansler & 
Havn, 2002).  27  In sll, hough they may appear to offer an easy solution to spreading 
"best practice," building ICT connections between practitioners may raise as many 
problems as it solves.   
While inevitably the challenge of changing practice locally and spreading 
knowledge along a network is more demanding than this schematic sketch can show, 
it is clear that incentives for innovation and communication face different forms of 
stickiness, from individual resistance to changing identity, to collective resistance to 
demands of embedding and reembedding, to unexpected differences between 
embedding conditions.  In this regard, no one should expect ICTs to offer a simple 
solution. 
I have laid out the CoP and the NoP so extensively because I think they help 
draw distinctions between SC and CoP theory while offering insight into the way 
knowledge flows and fails to flow.  Thus they help explore, on the one hand, 
incentives to help knowledge flow in a knowledge workshop, and on the other, the 
contribution ICTs can and cannot make--central themes in a knowledge society and 
themes to which I now turn. 
Epistemic and Ethical  Dimensions of  Practice 
Economic studies of the contribution of innovation to growth imply that society 
develops by promoting the codification of knowledge (Cowans et al., 1999), 
providing access to information (Mokyr, 2002), reducing the transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1981) and protecting private interests (North, 1982).  Social capital 
theory reflects most of these views, implying that the accrual of social capital, by 
increasing trust in particular, reduces transaction costs  and so increases economic 
efficiency (Coleman, 1988; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1996).28  A practice perspective 
modifies these notions of codification, access, and costs as the critical elements for 
                                                 
27 The "skeptical economists" (Cowan, David, & Foray, 1999) are thus right to point to the substantial 
overhead of encoding, though wrong to assume that, once that is done, remebedding is relatively 
costless. 
28 Some differ over whether social capital has tangible economic benefits.  Nahapiet & Sumantra 
(1996) seem fairly confident that it has, whereas Cohen & Prusak (2001) despite their title, are more 
agnostic. 
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innovation along two distinct dimensions, which for brevity we might distinguish as 
can/can't versus will/won't.  On the one hand, even with access, there are difficulties 
around what people can share.  On the other, there are also difficulties concerning 
what people will share.  These challenges, it should now be clear, are not simply 
economic.  Local communities and even disaggregated networks of practice may 
simply not want to share what they know (Constant, 1989); or (and this lies on the 
same dimension), they may not want to hide what they know, despite the existence of 
regimes of appropriation.  To clarify these dimensions, we need to understand a bit 
more about the epistemic and ethical consequences of practice.29 
Epistemic  entai lments:  can/can't  
Modern society organizes itself around a division of labour, which might as easily be 
called a division of practice.  As practice gives rise to knowledge, these division have 
epistemic implications.  The division of labour/practice, as the argument presented so 
far would suggest, produces a division of knowledge.  Knorr-Cetina (1999) helps 
clarify this process in talking of an "epistemic culture" (which she likens to a 
Durkheimian collective conscious).  Cultures are determinants of meaning, so, as 
most people accept, within cultures, knowledge can travel with relative ease; between, 
it usually cannot flow without difficulty.30  The same is true of NoPs--which are 
epistemic cultures resulting from common practice.  Promoting flow within a NoP, as 
suggested, is relatively easy.  Promoting it across the epistemic gulfs between 
practices is much more challenging--even when the different practices lie together 
within an organization (Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2002; Osterlund, 1996)--but critical to 
promoting innovation and in dealing with such things as "complementary assets" 
(Teece, Rumelt, Dosi, & Winter, 1986) (Richardson (1972) more judiciously called be 
called "complementary activities," which at least opens the door to the significance of 
practice). 
This problem of "stickiness" is well recognized, though it is not always 
considered in terms of practice and is instead often addressed as a problem of 
information, to be addressed by ICT.  Simply pushing information across an epistemic 
                                                 
29 While Foss (2003) argues that organizational analysis does not consider interactions of "cognition" 
and "motivation," this paper attempts to connect the two along these epistemic and ethical dimensions 
(see below), though probably not in a form that Foss would approve. 
30 Mokyr (2002), for example, acknowledges the difficulty of getting knowledge from Europe to Asia 
and vice versa. 
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gulf is not a great deal of help.  Alternative strategies for bringing two different 
communities into alignment, include using standards, routines (Nelson & Winter, 
1982), boundary objects (Star, 1989), or boundary spanners.  Most of these, however, 
tend to be fairly static, establishing a fixed relationship between two communities but 
offering little scope for dealing with the dynamics of a changing relationship. 
The challenge faced here may help clarify the advantages of the famous "lean" 
Japanese manufacturing over the conventional U.S. system (Womack, Jones, & Roos, 
1990).  The U.S. system, in the tradition of Taylor and Ford, works a with an 
entrenched mental/manual division of labour.31  Cars are built by workers on the 
production line, who report to foremen who do not work on the line but oversee those 
that do.  Through the foreman, who stands at one remove from the practice of the line, 
lies the path to the rest of the system, the mangers, the engineers, the designers, and so 
forth.  Communication, in this system, has to bridge all these divisions cross the gulfs 
of practice/knowledge that separate them.  One way to deal with this challenge is to 
formalize reporting, but formalization has ultimately to assume in advance the 
character of the problem, so if formalization is rigorously followed nothing 
fundamentally new can be reported.  Consequently, the U.S. system, though 
encumbered with ICTs has a great deal of difficulty dealing with novel problems.  
Here, information may flow, but unexpected knowledge (the critical knowledge to 
repairing breakdowns) sticks. 
The lean system also works around about a division of labour, but not only are 
there many fewer divisions, there is also a great deal in the structure that helps avoid 
or bridge them.  For instance, less hindered by mental/manual divisions, the workers 
on the lean lines have responsibility for many of the issues that arise there (Womack 
et al., 1991).  Work groups can address the challenge of understanding the issue itself, 
without having to deal with the extra challenge of how to communicate it to someone 
both outside the team and outside the practice--who, if and when the problem is 
understood, must face the mirror-image problem of communicating what is to be done 
back to the workers on the line.  Where such divisions cannot be avoided, efforts are 
                                                 
31 Along with an entrenched mental/manual division of labour (which is evident in its highly 
managerial sports), the U.S. also has a profound faith in the power of explication.  Toulmin (2001) 
argues that this faith may be misplaced.  He notes intriguingly that people may agree in practice but, 
when they produce reasons for this practice, find they disagree in principle.  Eckert (2001) gives a nice 
example of a group of girls who use an image to represent their unity, but when they are asked to 
explain what the image means produce quite different explanations. 
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made to blurr the boundaries of practice.  Japanese engineers, for example, spend their 
first three months with the company on the production line.  This makes them 
participants--if only novices--in the practice of manufacturing.  Similarly, when 
production on the line slows, line workers are sent out to work with the sales force, 
where they get to understand the challenge of selling what they build.  As a result, 
through common practice, epistemic barriers become usefully susceptible to leakage. 
Ethical  commitments :  wil l /won't  
Lean car production illustrates, from a practice perspective, how knowledge sticks or 
flows at the boundaries between practice and a couple of examples of ways to get 
around the problem in the context of formal organization.  But even where knowledge 
can be shared more easily than this, we also need to understand why and when people 
will and will not share what they know.  Regimes of appropriation assume that those 
who have competitive knowledge will not share it with those outside the regime.  
Conversely, knowledge management systems tend to assume that people will share 
the useful knowledge they have.  Incentives are offered in both cases.  Despite these, 
however, people will sometimes share what is meant to be protected, and conversely 
will not share, despite encouragements, when they are expected to.   People may resist 
incentives from the market economy aimed at individual self-interest on behalf of 
collective interests and what Thompson (1971) famously called the "moral economy" 
(Bollier, 2002).  Knowledge, that is, may stick or flow for ethical rather than 
epistemic reasons.32 
In creating social allegiances, the division of labour produces ethical as well as 
epistemic commitments.  As Marx and Engels (1978) argued, those among whom 
labour is divided develop a "communal interest" (p. 53).  Durkheim (1960) expands 
this notion when he argues that "The division of labour becomes a predominant 
source of social solidarity at the same time it becomes the foundation of the moral 
order" (p. 333).  More recently, the ethical philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) 
argued that "the self has to find its moral identity in and through its membership of 
communities" (p. 205).33   Thompson, following Marx, suggests that such social 
                                                 
32 These are more collective than the individualist motives discussed by Foss (2003). 
33 As both are cited in this paper, it should be noted that Toulmin and Giddens both strongly reject 
MacIntyre's view of moral order. 
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groups will resist, in the name of their moral interests, changes in the economic and 
social order that they deem unreasonable.  
Thompson's draws his example from the late eighteenth century.  Across the 
century, people resisted the shifting power that came with the rise of capitalism and 
was felt in, among other things, the denial of customary rights and the appropriation 
of common land (which, pace Harding, had been developed and protected through 
collective action (Moor, Shaw-Taylor, and Warde, 2002)) or of collective produce by 
individual interests.  People responded particularly aggressively when they found 
factors taking or simply pricing corn produced locally out of local markets in order to 
sell it elsewhere, resulting in some cases in local starvation.  To prevent this, people 
from where the corn had been produced seized shipments, organized impromptu 
markets, and sold the corn at prices the local market would bear (delivering the 
income to the owner).  These collective actions, Thompson argues, reflect the struggle 
of the moral economy with the market economy. 
I will elaborate on implications of this moral economy and its tension with the 
market in the following discussion of "open source" software [OSS].  For the moment, 
it is worth emphasizing how practice, through creating epistemic commitments, can 
create significant tensions between identities of allegiance, such as membership in an 
organization and identities of practice, such as participation in a profession.  Arrow 
(1974, 1984) highlights the way that scientists in corporations, torn between their 
professional obligation to openness and freedom and organizational mandates for 
secrecy and authority, exemplify this problem.   
Open Source Practice 
The success of OSS--whereby remarkably robust software has been created by loosely 
connected, independent programmers (von Hippel & Krogh, 2003)--has challenged 
notions of the firm as a critical site for innovation (Schumpeter, 1947; Chandler, 
1962; Nelson & Winter, 1982),while turning attention instead to the loose, informal 
networks which produce OSS.  Some see these networks as foreshadowing the 
economic structure of the future (Castells, 2001, Lamoreaux, Raff & Temin, 2002; 
Piore & Sabel, 1984; Sturgeon, 2003).  OSS has also questioned the idea that well-
defined and well-protected individual property rights are the price society should pay 
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for the efficient production of socially beneficial intellectual goods.34  Consequently, 
it seems a useful site to address issues raised in this workshop and this paper.  This 
section, then, situates ideas discussed already--of CoPs and NoPs, of incentives, 
innovation and communication, and of epistemic and ethical commitments--in the 
context of OSS, while addressing central themes of the organization of a knowledge 
society and the incentivization of innovation. 
 CoPs,  NoPs,  and formal  organization 
OSS coders present interesting examples of CoPs and NoPs.  Though some 
researchers (Kogut & Metiu, 2000) have labeled the collective of Linux contributors a 
CoP, this collective is too large and amorphous to fall under the present use of the 
term.  It would, however, qualify as a NoP: the membership do share a common 
practice (coding) and very similar person-world relations.  On the other hand, within 
distinct groups working on a particular project--a driver, port, or most critically the 
kernel--members fairly directly coordinate how tasks will be divided or shared, who 
can and cannot "commit" to that particular project, and so how the group evolves over 
time.  Consequently, coordinating practice and helping determine its reproduction, 
these smaller projects qualify as CoPs, by the definition offered aboce.  Critically, 
membership in these both NoPs and Cops is not by affiliation or association, it is 
through practice.  OSS communities involve a fairly strict meritocracy.  You perform 
your membership by contributing.  If you cannot hack, you can't belong.  There is no 
other qualification.  In that way, OSS coders might be thought of rather pure CoPs 
and NoPs, where the centrality of practice is not obscured by institutional or 
organizational factors. 
On the other hand, OSS communities are distinct from most other CoPs 
because they do not seem to require the face-to-face interaction.  Before embracing 
ideas of the death of distance and the end face-to-face interaction, we should note the 
peculiarities of this particular practice.  Not only does practice here almost always 
engage seamlessly with global communications technology, but also that technology 
and the projects involved, though highly sophisticated, constrain practice tightly 
within quite distinct limits.  Consequently, face-to-face communication may become 
less important.  Outside those limits, when, for example, trying to develop complex 
                                                 
34  OSSS has cleverly (if a little quixotically) used IP law to defend itself (O'Mahony, 2003) 
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new features (such as the implementation of SMP in FreeBSD (Jorgensen, 2001) or to 
plan the future of the Linux kernel, coordination does indeed seem to require face-to-
face interaction.  Moreover, OSS practice is surrounded by robust face-to-face 
institutions that support it almost invisibly.  Not only do firms and universities support 
most people who work in OSS (Lakhani, Wolf, & Bates, 2002), but such 
organizations introduce OSS coders into the practice--as, indeed, such institutions, 
often unknowingly, launched central features of OSS including Unix (at AT&T), 
GNU (at MIT), BSD and BIND (at Berkeley), Linux (at Helsinki University), and 
Apache (at NCSA).  Indeed, rather than the alternative to conventional forms of 
business and education that some theorists envisage, OSS networks appear to be 
complementary to them, feeding off and feeding into formal organizations.  Instead of 
seeing the history of organizational forms as one of replacement, with networks 
replacing firms, it may be better to see them in terms of increasing differentiation and 
complementarity:  networks and firms, not networks or firms. 
Barriers  to  communication:  epistemic  commitments  
In their success, OSS networks illustrate how knowledge can spread within a NoP, 
pushed both by practitioners' will and ability to share and constrained by the common 
material world they work with.  Unfortunately. OSS networks also help illustrate how 
difficult it can be to move knowledge across divisions of practice--even in a relatively 
static form--particularly across the division between producer and consumer.  OSS 
coders, unexpectedly successful in providing software along their networks, have had 
a great deal of difficulty addressing directly the practices of "ordinary" computer 
users outside these networks.  (OSS coders, for the most part being anything but 
ordinary.)  In ICTs, the conventional way this is done is through user interfaces.  
These form a boundary object (Star & Greisemer, 1989) coordinating the two 
different practices (of expert and ordinary user) without demanding that practitioners 
on either side understand each other.  The boundary object and its designer mediate 
between both practices--this, indeed, is the critical challenge and importance of good 
design.   
Within its networks, OSS has developed around a system of progressively 
transparent, modularized black boxes that, when necessary, can be opened and 
inspected, but otherwise can be taken for granted (Tuomi, 2001).  Programmers can 
take them on trust or inspect them at will.  This strategy does not work so well with 
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unsophisticated computer users, for whom the closed box is as opaque as the open one 
is a quagmire.  What they need is less like transparency and more like a mirror:  users 
need to see not into the programmer's strange world (which OSS wonderfully 
provides), but a reflection of their own, familiar world.35  For the distance between the 
two sides to be bridged, it first has to be understood as one not of information 
shortage--to which the conventional response merely burdens the user even further 
(Brown & Duguid, 1996b)--but of distinct practices.  OSS has struggled to reflect 
ordinary practice in its interfaces--even with the Windows-like GNU/Linux graphical 
user interfaces KDE and GNOME.36  Here we may perhaps be confronting one of the 
limits of these creative networks such as OSS.  Weakened by their own strong ties 
(Granovetter, 1973) though very good at reinforcing the knowledge within the 
network, they face difficulties in developing the necessary "negative capability" to 
understand those outside the network and to look on their own practice from an 
outsider's perspective.  That task--particularly as it is represented in the ordinary-user 
interface--may not be decomposable, may not, in Raymond's (1999) terms, be made 
shallow by multiple eyeballs (Jorgensen, 2001) and for that reason may require 
complex organization and perhaps complex organizations.   
In the struggle to overcome epistemic barriers, we may start to understand, in 
terms of practice, the complementarity between the firm and NoPs such as the OSS 
projects.  As already noted, there has been a tendency to think of the relationship as 
one of replacement, with the network replacing the firm.  Benkler (2002), using an 
argument developed around human and social capital, suggests that IT has reduced 
the transaction costs that, according to Coase hold the firm together.  By decomposing 
tasks into small, modular granules, IT makes it possible for human capital to assign 
itself to tasks that previously required the hierarchy of the firm.  He gives examples of 
Slashdot, OSS projects, Project Gutenberg, Napster, Google and Amazon rankings, 
NASA "clickworkers".  All of these draw on distributed contributions of individuals, 
and each is remarkable in its own right.  But reading from left to right, each requires 
larger and larger organizations either to decompose the task for modularization or to 
                                                 
35 When Apple redesigned the Xerox user interface, it wisely reduced choices and simplified options 
that would have overwhelmed its customers.  The vilified single-button mouse is a legacy of this 
process. 
36 KDE, which is designed for the user to have greatest control over the configuration of the interface, 
is particularly difficult for people who may not understand either the implementation or the 
implications of the choices they are offered. 
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reaggregate the results.37  None of this argument either invalidates or deprecates OSS 
(or ICTs).  It does suggest, however, that as with technologies (Duguid, 1996), so 
with organizational forms, replacement may be less common than augmentation and 
complementarity.  The core competencies of successful organizations may lie in their 
ability to coordinate practices that, without external prompting, would be increasingly 
inward looking (Adler & Borys, 1996; Adler, 2003).  It the realm of user interfaces, 
the relationship between Apple and the freeBSD OSS project may exemplify this 
complementarity.  OSS may, then be telling us where NoPs can replace formal 
organization and, by the same process, where they cannot. 
Barriers  to barr iers :  eth ical  commitments and moral  economies  
As well as exemplary CoPs and NoPs, OSS coders provide an interesting example of 
ethical commitment and a moral economy at work.38  Clearly, code is not corn and 
starvation has not been a significant problem for OSS coders as it was for the 
labourers Thompson studied.  The parallel lies in the resistance to the appropriation of 
local labour and the denial of access for workers to what they helped produce.  In 
OSS, the primal case is the deal between MIT & Symbolics, which in the name of 
intellectual property denied programmers at MIT access to their own code (Levy, 
1984; Moody, 2001).  Similarly, copyright agreements between the University of 
California, Berkeley, and AT&T and then Novell attempted to deprive university 
coders access to Unix code, even though they had developed a significant amount of 
it.  In both cases, the coders responded by releasing or creating code in such a way to 
guarantee continued local access.  As the projects developed and contributors spread, 
the underlying commitment to resist closure was woven into the practice of coding.   
(Though there are many other reasons for contributing to OSS, a recent survey found 
more coders contributing because code "should be open" than for any other reason 
(Lakhani et al., 2002).)  OSS and closed code offer two distinct approaches to the 
incentivization of innovation.  OSS involves NoPs where people, because they share 
practice, can circulate the knowledge they have developed.  Economic incentives and 
legal restrictions try to arrange things so that they will not.  The moral economy, 
                                                 
37 Napster, of course, relies on the recording industry and Gutenberg on the publishing industry--as did 
the OED, another favourite example of open source at work avant la lettre (Lessig, 2001). 
38 Shared practice may also produce shared aesthetic commitments.  Moody (2001) notes that shared 
aesthetics are one way in OSS practice limits a tendency to "fork".  See also Tuomi (2002) p. 175. 
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however, insists that many do.  Hence, although there may be complementarity 
between OSS networks and formal organizations, there is also a good deal of 
tension.39 
In this OSS networks are not entirely new.. Like scholarly communities, they 
are part of a broader historic tradition in which ethical implications of social 
ownership and customary rights are closely associated with the epistemic implications 
of the practice.  Mauss (1990) analysed this tradition in his study of the "gift," which 
as Douglas noted is part of a French social tradition in reaction to Anglo-Saxon 
individualism.  For Tocqueville and Durkheim as for Mauss the individual was also a 
social being who through drawing on the common stock incurred social obligations to 
contribute to and maintain a common stock.  Neither the gift economy nor the moral 
economy is separate from the market economy.  All are entwined, as markets are 
"embedded" in the social world (Granovetter, 1984).  Creating markets and market 
incentives, then, becomes a remarkably tricky endeavour. 
Many of these ethical commitments also emerge in SC networks.  But I 
suggest the resistance is fiercer in NoPs than in other, heterogeneous networks, 
because by rewarding individual ownership and building barriers around intellectual 
property, the incentive system attempts to separate individuals from the newtork in 
which they shaped their identity and out of which their product came.  Intellectual 
property rights make private what was built on public resources and exclude from 
practitioners products to which their collective practice has contributed.  As networks 
of practice are less divisible than other social networks, so the reaction when they are 
artificially divided may be fiercer and the ability to disrupt division more effective.40  
Indeed, OSS may only be the latest (and most successful) of in a tradition of resisting 
such appropriation.41  In a similar vein, Thomas Rogers, one of the great early railroad 
designers, provided specifications of his improvements to the Patent Office, but did 
not request a patent (Kahn & Sokoloff, 1993).  Eli Whitney was also generous in 
providing details of his gin to other innovators, and was forced into court primarily to 
                                                 
39 Undoubtedly, all members of OSS networks do not share equally in the moral conviction--see, for 
example, the difference between the "free" and "open" software movements--but the practice creates 
strong pressure to observe certain ethical norms and to resist the commodification of collective 
products. 
40 For another fight over the transformation of public goods into private ones, see the fight over the 
human genome involving Craig Venter, Celera, and the publicly funded Human Genome Project. 
41 Thompson (1975) also writes about the way laws are "turned" in this way. 
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keep his inventions open by prosecuting those who tried to patent and profit from 
what Whitney had shared for free (Scotchmer, 1991).  OSS, which uses copyright to 
promote rather than restrict the right to copy inherits this tradition of using the 
intellectual property regime against itself and of putting the moral economy ahead of 
the economic economy.  The particular moral economy of OSS has been sufficiently 
productive that it suggests we may need to reassess the relationship between networks 
of practice and formal organization, the moral and the market economy. 
Conclusion:  IT & IP--Open or Closed? 
The paper has attempted to lay out a set of relationships between social practice, 
social entities (the CoP and the NoP), and social commitments (ethical and epistemic).  
In so doing, it has tried to highlight what distinguishes CoP theory from SC theory, 
looking beyond information and beyond individuals, to understand the complex social 
contexts in which knowledge is created, acquired, and circulated.  In so doing, it has 
tried to suggest that ICT cannot, on its own, bridge epistemic and ethical divisions 
created by practice.   Similarly, it has suggested that our intellectual property system 
[IP] may be introducing and reinforcing divisions which it would be better to try to 
overcome. 
In conclusion, I shall try to sketch some implications of these claims for ICT 
and IP respectively. 
ICT 
Focussing primarily on information and individuals, economists presume that 
communication involves the circulation of information and that new information 
technologies simply reduce communication costs--see, in particular, Mokyr's (2002) 
interpretation of Eisenstein (1983)--and thereby help promote the spread of 
knowledge.  As I have argued, ICTs deal primarily with the explicit dimension.  Thus 
they can promote leakiness of information, without being able to overcome stickiness 
of knowledge--the paradox that the skeptical economists found puzzling.  That is, 
ICTs are powerful disseminators of disembedded information but not of the tacit 
dimension.  They require the practice needed to receive, interpret, and reembed that 
information to be in place already to guarantee successful communication.  ICTs need 
to be designed, then, with practice in mind. 
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Eureka (Bobrow & Whalen, 2002), a well-known knowledge-sharing system 
implemented by researchers from Xerox to help circulate practice-based tips among 
the network of technicians, is an example of a elegant and successful ICT 
implementation that implicitly relies on the extensively shared tacit knowledge of a 
large body of technicians and honoured their moral economy.  (At the request of the 
reps, for instance, in its initial instantiation a major motivation was an ethic of sharing 
rather than the incentive of financial rewards.)  While acknowledging its success, it is 
important to understand its limits.  It worked well within the NoP of Xerox reps 
worldwide--people who shared a similar practice, working in a similar way on similar 
machines.  It has proved difficult to move knowledge out of this network to the 
networks of designers and engineers to whom these tips might provide useful insight 
into the failures of the machines they build.  From the perspective of practice this is 
not surprising.  The reps' understanding of the machines is not the same as the 
engineers'. 
The model has proved relatively hard to replicate, but this may be because 
alternative implementations have tried to use similar platforms to move information 
across boundaries of practice--in essence attempting to transform a peer-to-peer 
service into a hierarchical one.42  The argument presented here suggests that this will 
not succeed, both for epistemic and for ethical reasons.  Intriguingly, Orlikowski 
(2001) describes system designed to cross boundaries (between academics and 
students) which became successful transformed itself in practice into a peer-to-peer 
system among students alone.  The successes and failures of Eureka-like 
implementations intimate that developing IT to spread innovation and understanding 
the successes and failures of such developments requires taking account of not just of 
social capital (though that may be important) but also of social practice and the 
epistemic and ethical commitments it gives rise to. 
IP 
While, in the right circumstances and within the confines of shared practice, ICT can 
be designed to further the spread of information and encourage openness not only of 
software, but also of science more generally, we cannot jump to the conclusion that 
the technology inherently favours openness or access or that it reduces transaction 
                                                 
42 See also the Berkeley Central Valley Project (Feldman et al., 2003). 
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costs.  The degree of openness is a function of design and use.  ICTs actually makes 
very good black boxes.  They can, for example, hide code in binaries, a 
transformation which drove the early "free software" proponents to resistance.  It can 
also make secure or "trusted" systems for "digital rights management" (Stefik, 1996) 
and other forms of restricted communication and exchange (Bar, 2001).  Even for 
experienced programmers, understanding the implications of code can be very 
difficult.  When combined with the belief that innovation is best promoted through IP, 
these ICT capabilities contribute to a more general and more worrying trend towards 
closedness.  Technology is being designed to offer more tightly defined and finely 
divided control over property rights on the assumption that, because IP has made a 
significant contribution to economic development, ever-stronger IP will make an 
ever-stronger contribution.   But in the process, the balance between private control 
and public disclosure that IP previously maintained (Jaszi, 1996) (though not without 
difficulty, Litman, 2001) is being lost.  David (2000) notes the increase in patents that 
reveal little and in new forms of copyright than can reveal nothing (particularly 
binaries), while Kelty (2001) describes a move from Ziman's "public knowledge," 
theoretically accessible to all, to "publicly visible, privately owned" knowledge, 
where access may be denied.  (The use of peer-to-peer networks to share copyrighted 
music files would seem to be a reaction to this trend of restrictions and privatization.) 
This trend seems to move to some degree away from IP--which traded 
publication for legal protection towards trade secrets and the "code of code" (Lessig, 
2000), where nothing is revealed.  In many ways, this is a move back in time (Moser, 
2003).  Two hundred years ago, entrepreneurs hired idiots and customs officers 
searched suitcases in the effort to stop knowledge flowing ("Josiah Wedgwood", 
1867; Shaw, 1864).  Now we do it more efficiently with ICTs.  But this movement is 
not entirely away from IP--only from those aspects of IP that demand publication, 
copyright and patenting.  As Arrow (1984) has argued, purchasers rely on institutional 
endorsement to warrant what they cannot inspect for themselves.  When you 
download an Open Source package, you can inspect the code.  When you buy a 
proprietary, shrink-wrapped, licensed package, you rely heavily on the accompanying 
trademark.  Trade secrets and trademarks, the often underappreciated facet of IP, play 
together, allowing firms to resist openness.  Successful brands are a remarkably 
powerful form of IP, tipping the rents in complementary assets from the ideal shared 
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state that Teece (1986) suggests towards the strongest brand in the chain, which then 
squeezes all others (Duguid, 2003). 
Even OSS does not escape the power of trademarks.  While it has subverted 
copyright (in "copyleft") and resisted patents, it has embraced brands (O'Manhony, 
2003).  Linux is a trademark, one whose power, moreover, may help account for the 
software's ascendancy over the various flavours of BSD.  While Linux, wary of the 
centralization of copyrights in the Apache OSS model, keep copyright distributed 
among those who write the code, its brand is privately owned and increases in value 
every day.  Red Hat's remarkable market value after its IPO shows the power of such 
brands.  And given the paucity of business models under the GPL, it is not wholly 
surprising, then, to see another OSS distributor, Mandrake, trying to monetize its 
brand.  Brands in other sectors change hands every day.  It would not be surprising to 
see them change hands here.  The Unix brand, after all, has been alienated from the 
Unix code.  Unless it is recognized that OSS is not independent of the market but 
integrally part of it, the IP constraints that the moral economy has pushed out through 
one port may be brought in through another by the market economy.43  More broadly, 
until we understand that innovation is an aspect of social practice and is hedged in by 
both epistemic and ethical constraints and boundaries, our chances of devising an ICT 
system that does not stumble over epistemic boundaries and an IP that does not 
affront the ethical commitments of people contributing to the knowledge economy 
will be severely limited. 
Finally, to narrow these broad conclusions down to some more specific 
recommendations from the perspective of practice.  In general I suggest that we need 
to move even further away from the assumptions of rational homo economicus 
working in a world of information and individual property than social capital theory 
has managed to get.  In the process, we need to try to reestablish a balance between 
the market economy and the moral economy.  From the development of the Stationers' 
register and King James's Statute of Monopolies to the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act, Anglo-Saxon society has developed and modified incentives for the 
                                                 
43 Furthermore, if brands increasingly threaten to close off innovation, it may be important to try to 
return to their origins, when they were not alienable property so much as a way to hold manufacturers 
responsible for the quality of their goods.  Trademarks might become a source for openness if they 
became an implied warrant, over which trademark holders could be held responsible for the 
inadequacies of their branded goods. 
  
Duguid_Seville_v3.doc 29/36 Oct 1 2003  
dissemination of innovation in response to changes in the means of communication 
(Jaszi, 1991; Rose, 1993, Litman, 2001).44  ICTs--with their ability to enclose--have 
disturbed this balance once again.  Increasing the strength of IP, piling rewards on 
individuals while extracting ever greater monopoly rents from the network, the 
current trend, will only exacerbate the problem.  Indeed, in acknowledgement of the 
joint history of ICT and IP, it is worth considering ICT and the means of circulation 
get ever further from their roots, it may be time to return IP and the incentives for 
production closer to theirs.  Copyright for 14 or 28 years after the death of the author 
would seem adequate to garner all justifiable rewards in "Internet time."  Similarly, 
patents only for conventional technologies, not for business processes or software, 
would help acknowledge the distance between the old system and the new 
capabilities.  Software, as a form of expression, would remain with copyright.  
Business processes could look after themselves as they always have.  But perhaps 
most of all, in an age of trade secrets, trademarks, and et increasing problems arising 
from the trademarked products, it would be particularly useful to reassert the notion of 
trademarks as implied guarantees that carry with them, in cases where the 
trademarked goods are trade secrets, responsibility for quality and performance on the 
part of the trademark holder, who can only escape that responsibility by placing the 
trade secrets in the public domain.  That way, the incentive to hide and sequester 
would be balanced by important rewards for openness. 
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